The U.S. armed forces should be the most feared in the world. Unfortunately, reality is more complex than that.
Because a bombshell report exposes a fatal flaw in America’s military.
U.S. Defense Budget Scrutiny Urged Amid Industrial Shortfalls
Lawmakers are being called upon to examine the U.S. defense budget with an emphasis on bolstering industrial capacity, as recent operational strains highlight vulnerabilities in military readiness for potential high-intensity conflicts.
Navy Faces Missile Depletion and Equipment Losses in Active Deployments
The U.S. Navy’s ongoing operations against Houthi militants in Yemen have exhausted significant portions of its offensive and defensive missile stockpiles, with replenishment efforts projected to take at least two years amid limited production rates. In late October 2025, as the newest supercarrier USS Ford transited toward the Caribbean for counter-cartel operations, the aging USS Nimitz—nearing decommissioning—experienced two flight mishaps within 30 minutes in the South China Sea, resulting in the loss of an MH-60R Seahawk helicopter and an F/A-18F Super Hornet fighter jet, valued at over $100 million combined. All five crew members were rescued safely, and investigations into the causes—potentially linked to maintenance or environmental factors—are ongoing.
While industrial constraints garner significant focus, operational planning and training remain equally critical. Without robust war plans, enhanced production capacity alone cannot ensure effectiveness. The Navy’s preparations for a potential conflict with China rely on the Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) concept, which disperses forces to complicate adversary targeting, but its implementation faces substantial hurdles.
Challenges in Distributed Operations and China’s Anti-Access Strategy
Future conflicts carry inherent unpredictability, where minor variables can yield outsized outcomes. Military assumptions about warfare shape doctrine, training, and procurement, underscoring the need for adaptable strategies. Lessons from Russia’s invasion of Ukraine demonstrate that sheer mass and industrial output are insufficient without flexible execution.
China is assembling forces explicitly aimed at countering U.S. advantages, amassing thousands of land-, air-, sea-, and submarine-launched ballistic and cruise missiles, supported by advanced radars, drones, and satellites. These capabilities target U.S. assets within 600-1,000 kilometers of China’s coast, the operational range required for American aircraft and missiles to engage effectively. By endangering high-value platforms like aircraft carriers, China seeks to deter U.S. intervention in regional crises or inflict attrition in a Taiwan scenario.
Across services—excluding the Army’s base-defense focus—responses mirror DMO principles: dispersing assets to evade detection. Marine Littoral Regiments would deploy anti-ship missiles across the First Island Chain; Air Force fighters would hop airfields to mislead reconnaissance; and Navy surface combatants would operate independently with offensive armaments. However, full DMO execution demands decades of fleet expansion and capability upgrades, with current procurement limited to 90 Long-Range Anti-Ship Missiles (LRASMs) and 22 Tomahawk missiles in the Fiscal Year 2025 budget.
Presently, the Navy relies on Carrier Strike Groups centered on 100,000-ton supercarriers with 60-100 aircraft, protected by defensive warships. DMO envisions surface combatants like destroyers and cruisers launching anti-ship missiles from dispersed positions to dilute Chinese reconnaissance and expend their munitions. Yet the fleet lacks sufficient anti-ship weapons—most remain air-launched—and cannot rearm at sea, a capability dormant since the late Cold War and only revived in late 2024. Warships would need to return to vulnerable ports for reloading, sidelining them for days, unlike carriers which can refuel and rearm aircraft underway.
Congressional Tools to Bolster Near-Term Capabilities
Navies enter conflicts with existing fleets, which in turn dictate feasible tactics. The U.S. Navy cannot execute distributed operations today and may not for five years or more, necessitating a carrier-centric approach in the interim, augmented by compatible weapons and platforms.
Congress holds leverage to enforce this shift during deliberations on the Fiscal Year 2026 defense budget, projected at $892.6 billion, and interactions with Trump administration nominees. Options include maximizing carrier air wings with additional F-35 fighters and unmanned systems like the MQ-25—currently underutilized at 70 of 80-100 slots—to enhance offensive reach. Prioritizing air-launched munitions over ship-based vertical launch systems could accelerate deployment, given aerospace production outpaces shipbuilding.
The Constellation-class frigate program exemplifies procurement pitfalls: endless design alterations by Naval Sea Systems Command have inflated costs and delayed delivery, prompting its cancellation in November 2025 after two hulls, with funds redirected to faster alternatives. While industrial bottlenecks persist, recent acquisition reforms facilitate quicker scaling of air-launched weapons and uncrewed systems. Long-term investments in naval yards will yield results, but immediate priorities must equip the current fleet—especially with warnings of a possible Chinese move on Taiwan by 2027 from former Indo-Pacific Command leaders like Admirals Davidson and Aquilino.
